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Henry H. Foster, Jr.One of the most momentous events in the history of any culture is
the secularization of law. Both in Rome and in England, secularization
was achieved and a distinct and independent legal profession and court
structure were established for the adjudication of rights and the imposition of duties. The law of marriage and divorce, however, did not fit
neatly in either category of the dichotomy between that which was
Caesar's due as contrasted with matters spiritual.
Max Rheinstein, the dean of family law scholars and comparativists,
is the one man in the world who has the knowledge and wisdom to place
the long struggle between human needs and social control of marriage
and divorce into proper perspective and appropriate context. His longawaited volume, Marriage Stability, Divorce, and the Law, is an expansion and documentation of ideas previously expressed by him in
numerous articles. Its greatest value lies in its realistic insistence that
the stability of marriage, rather than a divorce rate of zero, should be
the social goal of a modern urban society. Legislatures, courts, lawyers,
and theologians who are concerned with pragmatic consequences rather
than dogma should pay heed to this wise sociological study of law in
action.
Professor Rheinstein notes that:
In Western civilization two trends can be traced, two set of drives,
ideas, and ideals which have shaped our present institution of
monogamous marriage including divorce. The struggle between
and intermingling of these two trends has brought about results
which have varied from time to time and which now vary from
place to place. One of these two trends has prevailed for centuries.
In recent decades the pendulum has come to swing in the direction
of the other, but there has not been a complete reversal of the ideas
that have been dominant for the last fifteen hundred years.
The two competing ideologies may be called Christian-conservative and the eudemonistic-liberal. When carried out consistently,
the Christian-conservative principle implies that marriage is indissoluble save by death. Its consistent opposite implies that mart Professor of Law, New York University.
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riage may be terminated by either party at any time. The former
principle is that of Roman Catholic canon law. The latter principle
prevailed in ancient Rome in the time of the principate; in modern
times it does not seem to have been fully adopted anywhere, at
1
least not in official law.
Following the Reformation, the interaction between the two trends
discerned by Professor Rheinstein produced a compromise in most of
the western world. "In its totality, the American law of divorce constitutes a compromise," '2 according to Professor Rheinstein. In theory, the
legal dissolution of a valid marriage was possible only where an innocent victim sought such relief and by adversary procedure proved that
the other party was guilty of a capital marital sin. In reality, however,
"[a] conservative law of the books has been turned by the courts into a
different law in action in which the ideas of liberalism are given an
outlet of an often extreme character. Officially or unofficially, liberalism
has come to dominate the American practice of divorce. ' 3 The most
significant fact regarding the divorce process is that in state after state
and country after country in the western world, well over ninety percent of all divorce cases are uncontested and in reality we have had
divorce by mutual consent for over a century. In the United States,
as Professor Rheinstein explains in detail, de facto divorce by consent
is constitutionally protected and immunized from attack by the full
faith and credit clause.
The current debate regarding divorce reform concerns the extension
of the privilege of divorce to a single party to a marriage, contrary to
the wishes of the other (blameless) party, at least where the marriage is
deemed to have broken down. Although Professor Rheinstein concedes
that "[b]y its very essence a divorce is a restoration of the parties to the
freedom of remarriage," 4 and "a divorce law which discourages remarriage or saddles the husband's new family with unbearable burdens is
self-defeating, '" 5 he raises serious questions about statutes that purport
to base divorce solely upon the breakdown of marriage. He criticizes
California's new divorce statute for poor draftsmanship and a lack of
guidelines and of meaningful definitions. 6 Since few if any divorces have
been denied under the new California law, and there is no procedure by
1 Pp. 10-11.
2 P. 28.
3 Pp. 29-30.
4 P. 124.

5 Id.
6 Professor Rheinstein also criticises similar deficiencies in the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act, promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws but rejected by the American Bar Association in 1972. See ch. 15.
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which the reality of breakdown is examined and verified, the next logical step would be to abolish judicial proceedings and to permit administrative divorce by unilateral registration. The social consequences of
that step need no elaboration if Professor Rheinstein is correct in his
observation of experience thus far: "Unquestionably, the knowledge
that in the case of failure a divorce can be obtained with ease has contributed to the development of [an] inclination to take the step of
marrying less seriously. To that extent it is justified to say that divorce
breeds divorce." 7
Perhaps only the criminal law presents problems of exhortation and
choice of sanctions as interesting as those presented by the law of divorce. To Professor Rheinstein, "it seems that the law is impotent to
prevent the conclusion of hasty or otherwise ill-considered marriages by
restrictions, and that the only remedies promising a measure of success
are again family life education and counseling." 8
For over fifteen hundred years the Church was plagued with uncertainty and doubt as to the efficacy of requiring religious ceremonies for
the celebration of marriage. As a practical matter, the Church tempered
its dogma that marriage was a sacrament and indissoluble with a procrustean law of annulment. Today, the escape hatch of annulment is
no longer readily available for Roman Catholics, and civil divorce does
not permit the devout to remarry. But, asks Professor Rheinstein, does
the unavailability of divorce promote the stability of marriage? Or,
phrased differently, do permissive divorce laws engender family breakdown?
In trying to answer his own questions-a dangerous undertaking for
any professor-Rheinstein presents the inconclusive evidence on the
subject. He draws upon several projects that he has directed or been
associated with, including studies of German, Italian-Swiss, and American incidence of family breakdown and divorce. He also recounts the
story of Samuel Dike, a founder of a national organization to oppose
divorce. Dike initially sought to bolster his case against divorce with
statistical data, but, after the facts were at hand, came to doubt the
efficacy and feasibility of making divorce law more strict. 9
Perhaps the most persuasive evidence that the official law of divorce
has a minimal effect on the stability of marriage is the report of Alexander Broel-Plateris, which was prepared under Professor Rheinstein's
supervision and appears as Appendix A to Rheinstein's book. Rheinstein summarizes the results of the Broel-Plateris report as follows:
7 P. 419.

8 Id.

9 Pp. 44-4 .
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(1) Great permissiveness of the law, while it may be associated with a
comparatively high incidence of marriage breakdown and divorce, is
also associated with a lower incidence of separation without divorce.
(2) Differences in the incidence of marriage breakdown between residence areas of the same state are even greater than those between states;
that is, breakdown and divorce are higher in urban than in rural areas.
(3) The incidence of marriage breakdown and the permissiveness of
divorce laws are positively correlated with "a number of nonlegal variables indicating degree of industrialization, economic position of
women, religion, and what may be called the degree of comparative
settledness or restlessness of an area."' 1
It seems relatively certain that a repressive law of divorce engenders
a higher incidence of prostitution, concubinage, the mistress system,
and illegitimacy. Separation without divorce is the favorite means of
self-help. The unavailability of divorce also leads to the social acceptability of illegal divorces like those formerly obtained by Swedes in
Copenhagen or those currently procured in Uruguay by disgruntled
victims of holy deadlock from Brazil and Argentina. A restrictive divorce law led New Yorkers to patronize a series of divorce mills abroad
-to the perversion of the law of annulment at home. The relatively
low divorce rate in New York before the Divorce Reform Law of 1966
concealed the fact that New Yorkers too enjoyed divorce by consent,
although they either had to travel or to stay at home and commit perjury to obtain it. When Italy had no divorce, its separation rate was
higher than the divorce rate of Great Britain, France, Poland, and Belgium."1 Another study showed, however, that the marriage breakdown
rate in Ticino, Switzerland was significantly higher than that of neighboring Comasco, Italy, although not as much higher as might have been
anticipated. 12 Moreover, a number of Italians had moved to Ticino in
order to get a divorce there.
It is a reasonably good guess that compared with other factors derived
from social change, such as the independence of women, urbanization,
anonimity, prosperity, etc., official law has but little to do with the stability of marriage. As Professor Rheinstein points out, welfare laws,
education for marriage, and marriage counseling are of far greater
significance.
Marriage Stability, Divorce, and the Law is a classic that will be
widely read by sociologists, lawyers, and historians. Separate chapters on
Japan, Sweden, Italy, Russia, France, and "the cultural breakthrough"
10 Pp. 306-7.
11 P. 159.
12 P. 305.
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in England and the United States are valuable summaries of historical
and sociological developments. Such separate treatment is tied together
by introductory and concluding chapters that enable one to see the
forest as well as the trees. It is a remarkable book in that regard-an
accomplishment that others who were handicapped by insular or parochial outlooks were never able to achieve.
If there is any defect in Professor Rheinstein's book, it is a failure to
reckon specifically with recent developments in the various liberation
movements that may eventually influence the law of marriage and divorce. The institution of marriage is under attack today, and the avantgarde may question the social desirability of attempts to strengthen the
stability of marriage. Professor Rheinstein assumes that marriage should
be stabilized, but he is circumspect about the proper means to that end.
His book is a guide for reform-one that should be in the hands of
every legislator and judge-but it is not a call to revolution. Since
Professor Rheinstein is kindly and wise, and ever a scholar, it is to be
hoped that opinion and decision makers read and reread this book. In
all of the literature, there is not so fair, objective, and scholarly an account of a basic conflict among legal, social, religious and human values.
The message is that law alone cannot work: social goals must be defined,
and, in the long run, marriages are saved by education, counseling, and
forbearance. To these we might add a sense of humor, an ability to
laugh at oneself. It has been unreliably reported that the following
legend was inscribed over the main gate to the city of Agra, bearing a
message to which Professor Rheinstein may subscribe:
In the first year of the reign of King Julief, two thousand married
couples were separated, by the magistrates, with their own consent.
The emperor was so indignant, on learning these particulars, that
he abolished the privilege of divorce. In the course of the following
year, the number of marriages in Agra was less than before by three
thousand; the number of adulteries was greater by seven thousand;
three hundred women were burned alive for poisoning their husbands; seventy-five men were burned for the murder of their wives;
and the quantity of furniture broken and destroyed, in the interior
of private families, amounted to the value of three millions of rupees. The emperor re-established the privilege of divorce.' 3
It is possible to accept the legend of Agra and to agree with Professor
Rheinstein in general but to dissent from some particulars. Thus, Professor Rheinstein admits that when he was younger he viewed with
alarm the hypocrisy of the system, but says that he has come "not only
13 Quoted, with tongue in cheek, in N. BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO 80-81 (1962), from 28
1825, at 229.
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to accept but to admire the compromise" surreptitiously worked out in
the courts rather than openly in the legislature because "[i]t has preserved peace in respect of an explosive issue, explosive just because it is
an issue between beliefs deeply felt and thus unshakable by discussion
and incapable of open adjustment." 14 In this day and age, however, hypocrisy may come at too high a cost, and the secret compromise may contaminate the whole administration of justice. We are rapidly moving
from the unarticulated divorce-by-mutual-consent phase into a phase in
which the premise of the "cult of the dead marriage" is accepted. If the
marriage is dead, why should mutual consent be essential for interment?
Admittedly, as Jerry Geisler is reported to have said, embalming and
divorce are two things that should not be resorted to prematurely. But
why not eliminate the fault element entirely, and thus the hypocrisy,
by making breakdown the sole ground for divorce? The experience of
lawyers, as distinguished from the kinds of sociological proof relied
upon by Professor Rheinstein, indicates that divorce is only rarely opposed on reasonable grounds. Far more often, consent to divorce is
withheld-and the "compromise" short circuited-for reasons of spite,
greed, or vengeance. There is rarely a hope or desire to save the marriage. If this is true, and if one may reintroduce morality into an area
where it has been an egregious failure, the "mutual consent" compromise rewards the wrong people with the wrong motives.
As a supplement or a companion volume to this important work,
Professor Rheinstein may eventually add a full-scale discussion of marital property law-which he covers here in passing-and a set of guidelines and definitions for the breakdown ground for divorce. These are
issues of great current importance and there is no one better prepared
for the task of presenting an analytic and objective discussion than
Professor Rheinstein. The complaint is that the learned professor has
asked the questions but has not provided all the answers, and if he does
not do so, lesser men may bungle the job.
14 P. 254.

